By Kierkegaard, Søren; Beabout, Gregory R.; Kierkegaard, Søren
Treating Kierkegaard as either a very good philosopher and a corrective to our time, this paintings presents money owed of his key options of tension and melancholy. It explains the novel importance of those innovations for our knowing of freedom, and indicates how humanity can benefit from Kierkegaard's labours. Foreword through Alastair McKinnon
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Additional info for Freedom and its misuses : Kierkegaard on anxiety and despair
Vigilius terms these objective and subjective anxiety. The section on objective anxiety is initially very perplexing. Vincent McCarthy claims it is the weakest section in the book; he assumes that it is taken up only so there will be some contrast for the following section on subjective anxiety (1978, 41). However, McCarthy does not make clear that in this section Vigilius is trying to make sense of the “hereditariness” of sin. In chapter one, the view that sin is strictly hereditary, that is, that it causes a flaw in the being of subsequent individuals, is rejected.
However, the sketch of Vigilius in the book is not strong. There is only a very brief explicit description of Vigilius in The Concept of Anxiety. Moreover, his personality traits do not overtly exhibit themselves in the writing. There are, however, enough clues to piece together a character sketch of Vigilius Haufniensis. The name “Vigilius Haufniensis” literally means “watchman of the harbor,” that is, of Copenhagen, a harbor town. In the preface, Vigilius insists that the Latinate form of his name is not meant to be pretentious.
Third, the fall is not necessitated by concupiscence. An analogous argument supports this claim. Concupiscence is a strong desire for that which is prohibited. However, it is not necessary for the individual to act upon this desire. If concupiscence necessitated the fall, then the fall would not have been the responsibility of the one who fell, nor would it have produced guilt. Even if the prohibition intensifies concupiscence, neither the prohibition nor the concupiscence necessitate the fall (CA, 38-41).