Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms by Andrew Byde (auth.), Julian Padget, Onn Shehory, David

By Andrew Byde (auth.), Julian Padget, Onn Shehory, David Parkes, Norman Sadeh, William E. Walsh (eds.)

This publication constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the 4th overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2002, held in Bologna, Italy in July 2002 throughout the AAMAS 2002 conference.

The 20 revised complete papers provided including an introductory survey through the quantity editors have been rigorously chosen and better in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The publication supplies a special evaluate of the state-of-the-art of designing mechanisms and structures for agent-mediated e-commerce- The papers are prepared in topical sections on digital auctions, negotiations, and digital markets.

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Extra info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems: AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002 Revised Papers

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S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402–417, 1982. 15. Michael H. Rothkopf, Alexander Peke˘c, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131–1147, 1998. 16. Tuomas Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135:1–54, 2002. 17. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, and David Levine.

Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402–417, 1982. 15. Michael H. Rothkopf, Alexander Peke˘c, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131–1147, 1998. 16. Tuomas Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135:1–54, 2002. 17. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, and David Levine. CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions.

Only two more queries are necessary: bidder 1 is asked for the bundle at rank 3 (the answer is A, which renders the considered combination (3, 1, 1) feasible) and bidder 1 is asked again, if the value of the bundle represented by the currently considered rank (now rank 3) is 2 or more less than the value of the most preferred bundle. Again, the answer is “No”. 7 In total, the following information is revealed (to the auctioneer): v1 (rank1) = v1 (rank2) + 1 = v1 (rank3) v2 (rank1) v2 (rank2) + 2 v3 (rank1) v3 (rank2) + 2 This can also be summarized as follows: Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 A (x1 − 1) (x2 − 2) (x3 − 2) B (x1 − 1) x2 (x3 − 2) C x1 0 (x2 − 2) 0 x3 0 The efficient allocation is determined to be A !

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